

Landscape and National Identity in Europe: England versus Italy in the Role of Landscape in Identity Formation

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In the literature in English on landscape and identity, England is often taken as a paradigm case of the significance of a certain idealized landscape as symbolic of national identity.¹ It is invariably a rural landscape. Recent research in Scandinavia, Finland, and Switzerland seems to back this up.² Today, in this broad overview of the role of landscape in social identities I wish to challenge the English model by showing how much of a social construction it has been, representing in fact a narrow regional ideal if that, and suggesting through use of the Italian case a more complex association between landscape and national identity that sometimes privileges identities other the national (or, more specifically, ones that fail to become national) or that have contradictory connotations because of the power of past associations that point away from the national. My message, more evocative than definitive as befits a broad overview, is that the role of landscape in national identity should be related to the specifics of national-state formation than presumed to be invariant across all cases. In other words, the *politics* of landscape in particular cases is what should concern us, not identifying and celebrating landscape elements that presumably represent the natural flowering of a particular national identity.

Landscape and National Identity

National identities are based on the creation of “imagined communities” among people who do not know most of their co-nationals or much of the national territory other than that which they encounter in the course of their lives. Although some national identities have old roots in places within present-day national territories, national identities as they are known in Europe today are usually traced to the period in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when political elites “invented” traditions of group occupancy of a given national territory and began to associate this with popular rather than purely monarchical sovereignty.³

Based on the creation of national communication networks and vernacular literatures in national idioms, the circulation of common stories about national origins and tribulations, the casting of national definitions of taste and opinion, and commemoration of the heroic and tragic sides of a common past, national identities became basic components of self-identities for the burgeoning middle-classes and segments of the working classes across the whole of Europe by the close of the nineteenth century. Everything from the orientation of railway networks around capital cities to military conscription and mass elementary education conspired to produce political identities in which the national was increasingly dominant in relation to both other geographical scales and to social identities such as class or religion.

None of this happened, however, without intensive political struggle and rhetorical dispute. In his classic book *The Country and the City*, Raymond Williams showed that literary and cultural production, in the form of anthems, political pamphlets, and novels, derived much of its aesthetic appeal from conflicts arising from the changing geography of the times.⁴ New classes, interests, and ideas about national identity contended with existing ones in a struggle for control over territory. There was nothing inevitable about the outcome of this process. It took quite different paths in different countries. We err when we insist on making all cases conform to the history of a particular ideal-type, whether that is England, France or even the United States.

Identifying the means of producing national identities is one thing, while the content of those identities is another thing entirely. Much of the recent understanding of national identities rests on the spread, via mass education, of nationalist versions of history and the commemoration of nationhood associated with periodic rituals and “sites of memory,” places where the past of the nation is represented in the present, thus preserving in concrete form the *collective* achievements and sufferings of those people unknown to one another who have served and sacrificed for the nation.⁵ These sites range from monuments to national heroes and uprisings against foreign rule to war cemeteries and the built-form of capital cities (Whitehall and Trafalgar Square in London, the Arc de Triomphe and the Champs d’Elysees in Paris). Emotional investment in the visual map-image of the national territory and an idealized three-dimensional physical landscape of the national state have attracted much less interest.⁶ In particular, limited attention has been given to the images of the national territory - the

national landscape - that people might carry around with them; what can be called national “landscape ideals.” These are not necessarily designed for popular consumption, although competing groups may well endorse particular landscape ideals as part of the struggle over the expropriation of the national territory. It is more that they emerge into popular consciousness by means of both propaganda and that “common sense” which the famous Italian Marxist theorist/activist Antonio Gramsci saw as the social glue of an emerging nationalist hegemony. In the Italian case, as we shall see, Gramsci’s overall indictment of the failure of the country’s nationalizing intellectuals (and political leaders) is also true of its failure to construct a hegemonic consensus about a national landscape ideal.⁷

The English Case

Since the nineteenth century dominant images of landscapes in Europe for outsiders and nationalizing intellectuals alike would seem to have been “national” ones. Often these are quite specific vistas turned into typifications of a “national landscape” as a whole. Quaint thatched cottages in pastoral settings (England), cypress trees topping a hill that has been grazed and plowed for an eternity (Italy), dense village settlements surrounded by equally dense forests (Germany), high-hedged fields with occasional stone villages (France) constitute some of the stock images of European rural landscapes conveyed in landscape painting, tourist brochures, school textbooks and orchestral music. Ideas of distinctive national pasts are conjured up for both “natives” and “foreigners” by these landscape images. They are “representative landscapes,” visual encapsulations of a

group's occupation of a particular territory and the memory of a shared past that this conveys.⁸ They can also be thought of as one way in which the social history and distinctiveness of a group of people is objectified through reference (however idealized) to the physical settings of the everyday lives of a people to whom we "belong," but most of whom we never meet. Yet, these landscape images are both partial and recent. Not only do they come from particular localities within the boundaries of their respective nation-states (respectively, southern England, Tuscany, Brandenburg and Normandy) their visualization as somehow representative of a national heritage is a modern invention, dating at most to the nineteenth century. The history of these landscape images, therefore, parallels the history of the imprinting of certain national identities onto the states of modern Europe.

The agents of every modern national state aspire to have their state represented *materially* in the everyday lives of their subjects and citizens. The persisting power of the state depends on it.⁹ Everywhere anyone might look would then reinforce the identity between state and citizen by associating the iconic inheritance of a national past with the present state and its objectives. Yet this association is harder to achieve than might first appear. In cases where the past can be readily portrayed as monolithic and uniform, as with the English, consensus about a national past with unbroken continuity to "time immemorial" suggests a comfortable even casual association is easily accomplished. But nowhere else in Europe is landscape "so freighted as legacy. Nowhere else does the very term suggest not simply scenery and *genres de vie*, but quintessential national virtues."¹⁰ Even in England, however, not all is as it seems. The visual cliché of sheep grazing in a meadow,

with hedgerows separating the fields and neat villages nestling in tidy valleys dates from the time in the nineteenth century when the landscape paintings of Constable and others gained popularity among the taste-making elite.¹¹ Nevertheless, though “invented,” the ideal of a created and ordered landscape with deep roots in a past in which everyone also knew their place within the landscape (and the ordered society it represents) has become an important element in English national identity, irrespective of its fabulous roots in the 1800s.¹²

Elsewhere in Europe, capturing popular landscape images to associate with national identities or inventing new ones has been much more difficult. The apparently straightforward English case is potentially misleading, therefore. This is one good reason for turning to cases other than the English.¹³ It suggests a simple historical correlation between the rise of a national state, on the one hand, and a singular landscape imagery, on the other, however insecure this may now be in the face of economic decline, North-South political differences, the revival of Celtic nationalisms challenging the English hubris to represent something they alone now call “British,” the immigration of culturally distinctive groups unwilling to abandon their own separate identities, and the devastation wrought on the rural landscape by agribusiness.¹⁴ National-state formation elsewhere in Europe took a very different direction from that of England; not to say that everywhere else it was the same. Two aspects of the difference are vital.

One was the complex history of local and urban loyalties in many parts of Europe, particularly those later unified as Italy and Germany.¹⁵ In these contexts there was often

a long history of city independence and local patriotism with little or none of the early commercialization of agriculture and industrialization that swept English rural dwellers into national labor markets and national-social class identities at the very same time a state-building elite was strengthening and extending national institutions. The image of a bucolic past tapped the nostalgia of those experiencing the disruptions of industrialization, reminding them that all had not changed. Such landscapes could still be found, even if no longer experienced on a day-to-day basis. Later industrialization often also involved less disruption of ties to place. In particular, as electricity replaced steam-power, industries moved to areas of existing population concentration rather than, as in the case of the English coalfields, requiring that people move to where the industry was.

Another aspect was the external orientation of the English state and economy. Not only were English merchants, industrialists and travelers increasingly dominant within the evolving world economy of the nineteenth century, they were often nostalgic for what they had left behind when they traveled abroad and needed to compare what they saw with a datum or steady point of view. This led many of them to idealize an England in their mind's eye that was largely the product of a merging of their own experience and the renderings of England in paintings and other visual representations. This produced a unified vision that was much harder to achieve in those contexts where influential people had less empire, traveled less and thus had less need of a single, stable vision.¹⁶

Not only the idea of a national landscape but also that of national identity is also more complex than the simple story of the English case might make it appear. A national

identity involves a widely shared memory of a common past for people who have never seen or talked to one another in the flesh. This sense of belonging depends as much on forgetting as on remembering; reconstructing the past as a trajectory to the national present in order to guarantee a common future.¹⁷ National histories, monuments (war memorials, heroic statues), commemorations (anniversaries and parades), sites of institutionalized memories (museums, libraries and other archives) and representative landscapes are among the important instruments for ordering the national past. They give national identity a materiality it would otherwise lack. But such milieux of memory must coexist with other memories and their identities. National identity does not sweep all others away. Some local identities, such as the German attachment to *Heimat* (or home place), while remaining distinct, also feed into a wider national identity.¹⁸ Some diasporic groups, however, such as Scottish Hebrideans in North America or recent immigrants to Europe, retain local or religious rather than the national identities with which they are usually identified by outsiders.¹⁹

Italy as a Counterpoint

Italy provides a good case for examining the connection between landscape and identity. Not only was Italy at the center of the “visual revolution” of the Renaissance in which visual representation became a vital part of the modern means of communicating the meanings and significance of religious and political messages. It has also been a state in which the process of state formation was long delayed by the existence of alternative foci of material life (in particular, city-based economies), the home-base of the papacy and the

Roman Catholic Church, and local cultural identities alternative to that of the “Italian.” It may be at the opposite pole to the English case, insofar as creating a match between a representative landscape and an Italian national identity was a difficult and obviously “artificial” process from the start. It thus draws attention to the *process* of linkage between identity and landscape in more complex ways than would an examination of the English case. Also, much has already been written about the English case,²⁰ so looking at the other extreme of European experience as a whole (a late-unifying state with much internal cultural heterogeneity) has much to recommend it.

An Italian state only formed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although this tardiness in establishing a single state for the peninsula and islands had numerous causes, the strong municipal, city-state and regional-state governments (particularly in the North) held off the forces pushing the country towards unification. Most importantly, in the late Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, at the same time that the great western monarchies were consolidating territorial states in England, Spain and France, the politics of northern and central Italy was characterized by a fragmented mosaic of city-states and localized jurisdictions of a variety of types, from principalities to republics. It was the “extraordinary energy and growing capacity of urban centers [that] led paradoxically to the early elimination from central and northern Italy’s political firmament of any *superior* - king, emperor, or prince. The cities transformed themselves precociously into city-states with corresponding territorial dimensions and political functions.”²¹ This is not to say that they did not try to turn themselves into territorial states. More, it is that they failed to do so. As their economic strength faded in the eighteenth century, with

Europe's center of political-economic gravity moving north-westwards, the Italian mini-states proved easy prey to the expansionist ambitions of Austria and Spain. Even with foreign domination, however, (and this was a major stimulus to the development of Italian nationalism before unification), the capacity of Italian cities to penetrate into adjacent territories but with no one city winning control over the others was relatively undiminished. When European politics in the nineteenth century opened up the possibility of a national state for Italy, the initiative came from a regional-state, Savoy-Piedmont, "whose social and political structure was different, and of less glorious tradition, from that of the city-based states. Inversely, the rapid fall of the city-based states signals the absence of effective power to sustain them, even though their long survival testified for centuries to the vitality of medieval urban civilization."²²

It was from northern Italy and, initially at least, by northern Italians that Italy was made. It was the traditions of the city-states and the Europeanness of the Savoyard regime which gave unified Italy its monarchy that provided the "new" Italy with its mythic resources. The South, and the zones the Austrians had controlled in the North, had been "won" from foreign domination but foreign domination, particularly in the South, was seen as having created a society which was now doubly disadvantaged: geographically marginal to Europe and politically marginal to the "high" Italy of Renaissance city-states from which the new territorial state could be seen as having descended.

Foreign political-constitutional models, particularly those provided by England, France and the new Germany, were also important to the nationalizing intellectuals who set up

shop in Rome after the final annexation of that city to the new state in 1870.²³

Acceptance by other Europeans as a rising Great Power became a particularly important element in national policy that was to last until 1945. This meant taking very seriously what foreigners found exceptional in Italy. The new state could then build on foundations that would lead to respect from the others. It was to ancient Rome, both Republican and Imperial, and to certain Renaissance landscape ideals articulated by foreign visitors to Italy as well as by local savants that the visionaries of the new state turned. Both of these represented powerful images that would serve double duty: to mobilize the disparate populations of the new state behind it and impress outsiders with the revival of a glorious past, only now in an Italian rather than a Roman or a Renaissance form.

The Macchiaioli

Turning first to the Renaissance inspiration, the Italian *Risorgimento* (revival - through - unification) of the mid-nineteenth century was largely concerned with reestablishing Italy as a center of European civilization, as “it” had been during the Renaissance. Florence was, of course, the preeminent center of the Renaissance; long since consigned to the role of *città d’arte* or storehouse for all that Italy had been. It was in Florence in the 1850s that a group of landscape painters set about putting their talents into service for the new state. The so-called Macchiaioli painters (from the various meanings of *macchia*: spot, sketch, dense underbrush) set about defining a representative landscape for Italy. Not surprisingly, they saw Tuscany as the prototypical Italian setting. This was what they

were most familiar with. Of course, it had great Renaissance connotations. It also fit the foreign (particularly English) Romantic attachment to Tuscany and other locales in northern and central Italy, as expressed by the early nineteenth-century generation of poets and writers.²⁴ The city of Dante, Michelangelo and Machiavelli was the appropriate center for a national revival. The Macchiaioli used their Renaissance forebears and European contemporaries (particularly English painters) as their guides. They expressed their nationalism through a search for images that could be used to tie the noble past to the developing present. “They searched the riverflats along the Arno, the orchards and farms of the suburbs of Florence, the hill pastures around Pistoia, and the wild Maremma region (with its thick *macchie* of scrub pine and underbrush) for motifs appropriate to their fresh viewpoint. Their topographical specificity and personal response were totally integrated in what might be called a *macchia-scape* - the landscape that retained the sincerity of vision they admired in the Tuscan artists of the Quattrocento, but that also conveyed the modernity and nationalism of contemporary Italian life.”²⁵

Like the Risorgimento itself, the Macchiaioli idea had both Italian and European dimensions. For all of their other differences, leaders of the movements for Italian unification such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Count Camillo Cavour of Piedmont wanted to bring Italy “up-to-date” and to a social and political equality with the rest of Europe. The Macchiaioli were also both nationally and internationally oriented. In the art historian Albert Boime’s words “by asserting Italian individuality they hoped to contribute to a release of energies needed to make Italy a great nation, able to assume a role in the affairs of Europe.”²⁶ Their “sketch tradition” drew directly on Renaissance prototypes but also

was linked by the Macchiaioli to the French Barbizon school, just as the Risorgimento appealed for legitimacy to the French revolution and the two Napoleons. But the self-attached label of the school also had subversive overtones, if Boime's analysis has merit. Some of the painters were notorious punsters and self-defined "outlaws." The word *macchia* can mean hiding out in the woods (*farsi alla macchia*), living as an outlaw (*vivere alla macchia*) or publishing illegally (*stampare alla macchia*). In Florentine dialect *macchia* has the additional meaning of a "child of the woods," signifying someone without parents, marginal and disinherited. The wild and wooded Maremma region of southern Tuscany fit this aspect of the Macchiaioli vision; associating the painters with the secret societies (such as the *Carbonari*) that had stimulated the first efforts at Risorgimento. The *Carbonari* took their name from the charcoal burners of the forest who labored in secret away from the gaze of the authorities.²⁷

The "bible" of the Macchiaioli movement, Telemaco Signorini's *Caricaturisti e caricaturati al Caffè Michelangiolo* (*Caricaturists and the Caricatured at the Caffè Michelangiolo*) first published in 1893 but based on articles written in 1866-67, recreates the atmosphere of the popular café in Florence where the Macchiaioli congregated.²⁸ There were ten "core" members: Giuseppe Abbati, Cristiano Banti, Odoardo Borrani, Adriano Cecioni, Vincenzo Cabianca, Vito D'Ancona, Giovanni Fattori, Silvestro Lega, Raffaello Sernesi, and Telemaco Signorini himself. Underlying the book's gossip about who said what to whom is a narrative linking the history of the Macchiaioli to that of the Risorgimento. One connecting influence was Romanticism, even though the Macchiaioli were relentlessly realist in their artistic representations. As early as 1813 Laurence

Sterne's pre-Romantic masterpiece, *A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy*, was translated into Italian (Tuscan) by Ugo Foscolo, himself a famous poet and writer. Walter Scott's novels were also translated and widely read by literati in mid-nineteenth century Italy. The great Italian patriot Garibaldi was later often compared to Scott's hero Rob Roy, from the 1817 novel of the same name. In 1827 Alessandro Manzoni came to Florence to purge his allegorical novel of Italian unification (*I promessi sposi* or *The Betrothed*) of its Lombard expressions and rewrite it in the Tuscan (Italian) dialect.²⁹ All of these works marked a break with the formal and pedantic works that preceded them. They all accept nations as natural forms whose literary canons should reflect this fact. They also appeal to a certain naturalism that finds in physical landscapes an important source of the "spirit" of particular nations. Manzoni, for example, was fond of saying that he came to Florence to bathe his masterpiece "in the waters of the River Arno," as if the rewriting required his own presence in the physical surroundings, sounds and smells of Florence. Incidentally, this also gave a tremendous boost to the cause of the "Tuscanizers," those who wanted to establish the Tuscan dialect (because of its historic connection to such great *Italian* writers as Dante) as the national language of the new state.³⁰

Another element in Signorini's story of the Macchiaioli is a critique of previous landscape painters, who are seen as preferring foreign (particularly French) scenes to Italian ones. In particular, Signorini praises the autobiography of Massimo D'Azeglio (*I miei ricordi* or *Things I Remember*), an older historical novelist and painter, which was published in 1867. Though a social conservative, D'Azeglio (famous for his aphorism after Unification: "We have made Italy, now we must make the Italians") argued strongly

for a patriotic landscape ideal. This is what attracted the Macchiaioli to him. He celebrated the indigenous (Tuscan) landscape and shared their cultural aims.

Much of Signorini's story, however, is taken up with relating the history of the café and its patrons to the ups and downs of the campaign to unify Italy. Even the recollections of friends killed in the wars or the ideals of the Risorgimento conjure up landscape images when at certain moments he recalls them. Especially

during a beautiful autumn morning, or on a balmy spring day, or in a winter mist, or amid the sultry passions and strident song of the harvest-time crickets, when it happens that I climb alone the smiling hills of memories which crown our city [Florence]; or stroll along the fields and gardens populated with farmhouses and villas, along the banks of the Mugnone or the Arno, the Mensola or the Affrico, and come upon a small grassy area, off to the side and in the shade; then, having put down my old paint box, the faithful custodian of my personal impressions, inseparable companion of my distant voyages and nearby excursions, I lie down on my back next to it, and gazing intently at the profound blue of the heavens, I return with my thoughts to the past, now having become more significant to me than the future! ... And my entire past unfolds, not only its mad joys and its daring undertakings, but also its profound sadnesses and its infinite vexations.³¹

What Signorini finally reveals, therefore, is the deep relationship that existed for the Macchiaioli between landscape and the development of the Risorgimento. But it is not just any landscape. The landscape impressions are those of Signorini's native Tuscany;

of the River Arno, the hills surrounding Florence, the share-cropping peasants who are part of the landscapes in which they appear. The outstanding memories of his life return to him when he recalls the sites depicted by the Macchiaioli. The passage ends on the sad note with which many Italian patriots greeted the way in which Italian unification evolved: dependent on conquest and external (non)intervention more than popular uprising and revolt. Compensation is found in the private moments when art merged with life in the depiction of landscapes that expressed one's ideals and aspirations.³²

This culture of the Risorgimento associated closely with Florence and Tuscany was not to outlast it. Even as Florence became (temporarily) the capital of the new Italy in 1865 and was beginning to assert its position as a national cultural center, the Macchiaioli started to lose their social cohesiveness and their common political commitments.³³ Tuscany was not a smaller version of the whole of Italy. Tuscan history was not national history. Florence was not to be the permanent capital of the country. Their images did not stick, much like the promise of the Risorgimento itself. Quickly, the Macchiaioli were redefined as precursors of Impressionism or simply another school of provincial Italian painters. Only during Fascism were they once again raised as proponents of an idealized Italy, this time, of course, as precursors of the chauvinistic and ultra-nationalist vision of an older rural Italy beloved of the most reactionary Fascists.³⁴ With such unfortunate friends, rehabilitation has been a long time in coming.

Rome and its Ruins

A better known attempt at creating a representative landscape for Italian national identity than that of the Macchiaioli came to fruition after unification was achieved. This involved looking to the ancient past of Rome as the seat of empire to find inspiration for a new Rome around which the new Italy could be built. The selection of Rome as the capital certainly suggests that the Roman past was in the minds of Italy's unifiers even before unification was finally achieved. "For me Rome is Italy," wrote the great hero of unification, Giuseppe Garibaldi, in his memoirs.³⁵ As early as 1861, although not yet part of the new state, Rome was declared as capital. The annexation of Rome and its surrounding region not only provided the last chunk of the national territory claimed by Italian patriots but also a "neutral" city not associated, as were Turin, Milan, and Florence, with the local elites who had taken hold of the process of Italian unification.³⁶ In other words, as Birindelli puts it: Rome "became the capital not for the qualities that it had but for the ones it was missing."³⁷ This political advantage plus the obvious associations with a "glorious" past gave Rome crucial points over its competitors. Rome's international visibility also counted. Italian unification was more the result of international diplomacy than of nationalist revolt. Consequently, attracting outside support was critical. By way of contrast, German unification during the same period (1850-70) was much more internally oriented. The choice of Berlin reflected both the Prussian dominance of the new state and the Prussian state's prior commitment to economic and military growth as manifested in the growth of Berlin itself. Rome was so different. Rather than a center of national prestige or strength, Rome was widely viewed in the new state as a "parasitic" city that consumed but did not produce.³⁸ It was an ecclesiastical city without either manufacturing industry or modern bureaucracy.

But the choice of Rome was vital to the architects of a new Italian identity. First of all, across all of the movements for unification the city of Rome was itself a unifying force.³⁹ If there was a single “tradition” that the population of the peninsula and islands held in common it was that of ancient Rome. The myth of a unified past, however different from the present, underwrote the unified future which the Savoyard monarchy and its aristocratic allies who had taken control of the Risorgimento saw for the new state. Rome presented at least a strong image for a group concerned that the new Italy might turn out to be too decentralized for their political and economic interests. Rome also represented a vision at odds with the more parochial ones emanating from local elites in Turin, Milan, and Florence. Rome represented a central link in a country in which local and municipal attachments were strong. It was, in Bruno Tobia’s words, “the meeting point through which it became possible for municipalism to be projected directly towards a *national* dimension.”⁴⁰ Locating the capital in Rome also took on directly the claims of the Pope to be a temporal as well as a spiritual ruler. The Pope remained the one local ruler of pre-unification of Italy to reject the spirit and purpose of Italian independence and unification. As capital, therefore, Rome embodied symbolically various aspects of the Jacobinism and centralism that were hallmarks of Italian unification: the myth of Rome as a strong center to counteract the centrifugal pressures emanating from the real political divisions of the country represented by other places such as Florence and powerful institutions such as the papacy.

From the outset, the new rulers tried to make Rome a symbolic center for their regime. Initially there was an attempt, under the patronage of the Piedmontese politician, Quintano Sella, to establish a new center of gravity for the city to the northeast, beyond its 1870 core. This largely failed. It was easier and more profitable to local interests to concentrate government offices in the historic core. In this they largely succeeded; expropriating convents, monasteries, palaces, and other buildings from the previous papal regime. Another and more important symbolic method was by means of “patriotic building.” This involved locating monuments and public buildings to celebrate the new regime, recall its historic connections, and challenge the singular association of the Roman Catholic Church with the most sacred sites in the city. From one point of view, however, these efforts at securing a new monumental Rome in the years 1870 to 1922 came largely to nothing.⁴¹ As Tobia has argued in some detail, impressive ideological-rhetorical debate produced little physical change in the city’s landscape.⁴² Within the historic center only the subversive placement of the monument to King Vittorio Emanuele II (the first king of the new Italy) on the edge of the Capitoline Hill (the historic core of the city, next to the seat of the commune and the Roman fora) and midway between the Pope’s two seats, at the Vatican, and, as Bishop of Rome, at San Giovanni in Laterano, provided a powerful symbol of the new national identity in the new Rome. Even then the monument was to a person rather than to some abstract ideal of the nation, though during Fascism attempts were made to turn the monument into something more representative. The identification with the person of the monarch was particularly problematic, since many of the proponents of unification had been republicans or opponents of the Savoyard monarchy. Though the Vittoriano may well have been the “only true national

monument” that “aroused a common national feeling,”⁴³ its symbolic power drew attention to the *lack* of commemoration of the real heroes of the Risorgimento: Giuseppe Garibaldi and Camillo Cavour.

From another point of view, however, less focused on individual monuments, the changes in the fabric of the city representing the arrival of a new nation can be seen as more considerable. The reorientation of the axis of the city and the placing of monuments did create a new secular image for the city at odds with the ecclesiastical one that had hitherto predominated. In particular, the placement of the Vittoriano (the monument to Vittorio Emanuele II) and its construction in white Brescian marble at odds with the brown tones of surrounding buildings provided a new visual anchor for the city. Via Nazionale and its western extension, Corso Vittorio, ploughed a new east-west axis through the historic center, making Piazza Venezia, in front of the Vittoriano, the central hub for traffic as well as the new symbolic center of the city. Other changes, such as the embankment of the River Tiber, the straightening of streets and the “regularization” of piazzas into Euclidean shapes, and the clearing of archeological sites to set them off monumentally, also represented successful attempts at both remaking the city and associating the changes with the glories of the angular and rational city built by the ancient Romans before the “decadence” of later times.⁴⁴

Fascism continued what had begun under the liberal regime. Two new anchors to the city as a whole emerged over time: the Foro Mussolini to the northwest of the historic core (where the Olympic Stadium now stands) and the EUR complex to the southeast (built

beginning in 1937 for an exposition that was never held, finished in the 1950s). Possibly Mussolini's most important act in terms of the manipulation of urban space for political purposes was the transfer of his office from Palazzo Chigi to the Palazzo Venezia in Piazza Venezia in 1929. Thereafter, Piazza Venezia became the key space in Rome for performing the ceremonies and the ritual speech-making that were the hallmark of Italian Fascism. Broadcast to central piazzas in towns and cities throughout Italy, Mussolini's speeches from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia created a sense of national "togetherness" that Italy had never had previously and, apart from when the national football team takes the field, has not enjoyed since.⁴⁵

Mussolini, more and more the personification of Fascism as the years wore on, increasingly turned to ancient imperial Rome to provide a pedigree to his otherwise modernist movement. Reconstructing Rome according to an imperial image became a vital part of the agenda of Fascism. Plans were often compromises between different factions and architectural viewpoints. As a result, the outcome in terms of real changes was not always coherent. Segments of roads were built but they never went all the way to where they were intended to go. For example, a road was punched through the Roman fora between Piazza Venezia and the Colosseum (today called the Via dei Fori Imperiali) but the extension of this road, intended to lead inland and to the Adriatic was never completed. Drawing the city towards the sea, to celebrate a renewal of an outward, imperial orientation and claim the Mediterranean for Italy as *mare nostrum*, was perhaps the most successfully realized goal, once it was defined. The *autostrada* linking the outskirts of Rome to Ostia, opened in 1928, was the earliest manifestation of this

strategy. This was followed by the Via del Mare, linking Piazza Venezia to the southern outskirts, and the EUR project to pull the growth of the city seawards.

However successful as architectural projects, the impact of both Liberal and Fascist attempts at making over Rome as a representative landscape for the new Italy was severely limited.⁴⁶ For one thing, Rome was naturally policentric. The city in 1870 had a complex structure from its variegated past of eras of expansion and contraction. One consequence was that it lacked a single pre-existing monumental center that could be captured for the new national identity. The city was still the seat of the Pope, who, until 1929, refused to recognize the new state. As the headquarters of the Roman Catholic Church, Rome was still symbolically connected to the world “in between” ancient Rome and modern Italy that the architects of the new Italy had wanted to erase from popular memory in order to celebrate the arrival of the new state. Another problem with Rome as the setting for a representative landscape for Italy as whole was that there was too much past present in the city to offer singular interpretations of what was there. As a city of layers of ruins built up over the centuries, Rome lends itself to the image of Eternal City. But this image is at odds with that of a new national identity. The eclectic mixture of epochs and influences in the physical fabric of the city leads towards universalistic more than nationalistic interpretations. Rome is a city for the ages, and for all (at least, Christian) peoples.⁴⁷

Italy’s very Europeanness worked against achieving a long-lasting association between a particular landscape ideal and an Italian national identity. It remained forever associated

with the glories of ancient Rome and the Renaissance, phenomena that the whole of Europe (or, even more expansively, the whole of Western Civilization) claimed as parts of their heritage. Italianizing these also suffered from a number of features of Italian geography and society that point up the difficulties of realizing singular landscape ideals.

Roots of the Italian Difference

The first is the obvious one that Italy does not have an “integrative” physical geography. Its geographical identity as a singular unit is undermined by strong separations between the Po basin in the north and the mountainous spine/coastal plain pattern and islands to the south. As a result the physical landscapes “available” for expropriation are remarkably varied, reflecting both the terrain, the climate and vegetation of a peninsula stretching from the heart of continental Europe almost to the shores of Africa. This range, working against the effective integration of modern state, also produced a widely accepted continental/Mediterranean dichotomizing of Italian population and society that made a singular landscape image a difficult proposition to accept.⁴⁸ By way of example, Simon Schama points out the importance of the ancient metaphor of rivers as the “arterial bloodstream of a people” in bringing together facts of physical geography and national landscape images.⁴⁹ Unlike England, with the Thames, France with the Seine and Rhone, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with the Danube, and so on, in Italy rivers divide rather than bring the country together. The Po and the Tiber, to name the two principal rivers, never fit the bill. Sharing Italy with the Po, the Tiber had lost its imperial reputation. The mountainous spine of the country also works to disrupt west-east connections, making communication across the peninsula particularly difficult. A strong localism has been the result. As Enrico Castelnuovo and Carlo Ginzburg note for

the history of Italian art: “Italian polycentrism [has shown] itself to be far stronger than all attempts at centralization.”⁵⁰

Certain features of Italy’s historical geography also worked against the successful creation of a national landscape ideal. One of these is the absence of a dominant city, such as London in England or Paris in France, to subordinate the country to a singular vision. Rome was only the fifth city of the new state in 1871, exceeded in population by Naples, Milan, Genoa, and Palermo. As the capital city it grew vigorously, but it still is politically and culturally predominant only in its immediate hinterland and in parts of the South. Indeed, it suffers from a very negative reputation in other parts of the country, particularly in the North, where it is associated with corrupt politics and inefficient bureaucracy. Related to this is the continuing importance of local and regional identities in Italian culture and society. Dialect differences, local economic interests, and attachment to local customs and traditions remain very strong in Italy. Unlike in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, and more like Spain, class and status distinctions in Italy are expressed in local as much as in national terms of reference. “Folk” religious beliefs with strong localist connotations have remained strong - and resilient - in some regions even in the face of massive urbanization and social change.⁵¹ A powerful *campanilismo* or localism has persisted, therefore, rather than faded away in the face of pressures for nationalization.⁵² It has also proved impervious to ready co-optation, as in the German case, into reinforcing a larger national identity. At the moment in northern Italy a political movement (the Northern League) is attempting to use

local identities as the basis for either a program of radical federalism or secession from Italy.⁵³

Yet, at the same time, an Italian mass culture has developed that ties together what would otherwise be a disparate set of places. Two types of influence have been particularly important. One was the system of political parties that Italy acquired at the end of World War II. With strong regional and local constituencies, the parties enabled the creation of strong local-national connections by means of both the allocation of government jobs and contracts and the division of national-level resources (such as the state television channels) between the various parties and their supporting groups. This system of *partitocrazia* is now waning with the collapse of the main parties after the corruption scandals of the early 1990s.⁵⁴ The other is an Italian “culture industry” that markets films, television, art, and music in the country as a whole. Certain ideas of “Italianness,” associated with taste, design, style, and beauty emerged in the aftermath of World War II and have substituted for both the defeat and the continuing absence of other unifying symbols. National obsessions with television, football (soccer), and a cult of feminine beauty have been identified as particularly crucial components of this Italy-wide mass culture.⁵⁵

The two words for “country” in standard Italian, *paese* and *Patria* - the first used easily and frequently, the second self-consciously and infrequently - offer an interesting perspective on the balance between these polarized local and national identities. The first is typically used to refer to the local area from which you come and with which you

identify. *Paese* can be used to represent Italy as a whole (as in *Bel Paese*) and then represents a fusion of the local with the national. The second refers to Italy as a whole and is a formal term that would rarely come up in everyday conversation. In neither usage does it translate as “countryside” - which is the alternative meaning to that of country as *Patria* in English - and strongly associated with the English national landscape ideal.

Part of the problem for an Italian national ideal of any kind has been that the national institutions created at the time of unification have been seen by significant minorities as “foreign” impositions. Not only were the Savoyard monarchy and its affiliated institutions carried to Rome, the state brought novel practices to regions where the writ of any sovereign was historically weak (as in Sicily, for example) and many groups (such as serious Catholics and anarcho-syndicalists) regarded the state itself as illegitimate. The absence of a widely accepted civic nationalism or patriotism made inventing a singular vision of the state next to impossible. Fascism was, among other things, a way of trying to *force* unification; of bringing about the national uniformity and autarky that the dominant royalist strand of the Risorgimento had promised. Its failure, then, is revealed by the ready reversion to localism and particularistic identities that followed its wartime defeat.⁵⁶

Perhaps most significantly in accounting for the absence of a singular landscape ideal, however, Italy has lacked the dominant heroic event or experience upon which many singular landscape ideals are based. In England the shock of industrialization produced a

romantic attachment to a rural/pastoral ideal that has outlasted the original historical context. In the United States the myth of the frontier and the subjugation of “wilderness” has likewise served to focus national identity around themes of survival, cornucopia and escape from the confines of city life.⁵⁷ In Italy only the recycling of the idea of the Risorgimento serves a similar purpose. The problem is that the Risorgimento has multiple messages that have varied from the start, depending which “side” of the unification process one chooses to emphasize. Its landscape legacy is likewise divided: Florence versus Rome. When allied to disputes over later mythic episodes such as the impact of Fascism, the Resistance to Fascism (1943-45), and the political unrest of the period 1968-85, the net effect is to produce multiple interpretations of Italianness and its essential landscape that persist but mutate over time following dramatic events rather than a stable, singular interpretation that serves to knit all Italians together.⁵⁸

Finally, Italian unification was never able to successfully capture the religious beliefs and practices of the Italian population. From 1870 until 1929 the state remained alienated from the Church, denied access to its spiritual authority. Fascism tried to “sacralize” the state by building an alternative civic religion. But this had to coexist with existing religious affiliations and the physical presence of the Pope.⁵⁹ As a result the ritualistic power of the Italian state remained compromised, never able to obtain that symbolic investment in its attempts at designating certain sites as sacred to the nation and landscapes as representative of the spirit of the people that seem to arise so effortlessly in, say, the English or German cases.

Endnotes

¹ E.g. D. Lowenthal, "European and English landscapes as national symbols," in D. Hoosen (ed.) *Geography and National Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

² E. Kaufmann and O. Zimmer, "In search of the authentic nation: landscape and national identity in Canada and Switzerland," *Nations and Nationalism*, 4 (1998), 483-510; M. Jones and K.R. Olwig (eds.) *Nordic Landscapes: Region and Belonging on the Northern Edge of Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The English case, however, challenges this "modernist" view, as detailed in Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). But the fact that English nationalism goes back before the eighteenth century makes it more problematic as a "model" for understanding other European cases than it would be if its experience paralleled their's.

⁴ Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

⁵ See, for example, Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: les lieux de memoire." *Representations*, 26 (1989), pp. 7-25; Nuala Johnston, "Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography, and Nationalism." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 13 (1995), pp. 51-65; and Ilaria Porciani, *La festa della nazione. Rappresentazione dello Stato e spazi sociali nell'Italia unita* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997).

⁶ But, on the former, see Michael Biggs, "Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 41 (1999), pp. 374-405; and, on the latter, see, for example, Malcolm Andrews, *Landscape Imagery and Urban Culture in Early Nineteenth Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Elizabeth K. Helsinger, *Rural Scenes and National Representation: Britain, 1815-1850* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Mark Bassin, "Geopolitics in the *Historikerstreit*: The Strange Return of *Mitellage*," in Jost Hermand and James Steakley (eds.) *Heimat, Nation, Fatherland: The German Sense of Belonging* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), pp. 187-228; and Maunu Häyrynen, "The Kaleidoscopic View: The Finnish National Landscape Imagery." *National Identities*, 2 (2000), pp. 5-19.

⁷ Nadia Urbinati, "From the Periphery of Modernity: Antonio Gramsci's Theory of Subordination and Hegemony." *Political Theory*, 26 (1998), pp. 370-91.

⁸ Brian J. Graham, "No Place of Mind: Contested Protestant Representations of Ulster." *Ecumene*, 1 (1994), p. 258.

⁹ This is what social psychologist Michael Billig refers to memorably as "banal nationalism" with respect to all of the little signs of nationhood that surround us everyday, from the symbols on currency to flags, uniforms and other reminders of "whom we are." See Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications, 1995).

¹⁰ David Lowenthal, "British National Identity and the English Landscape." *Rural History*, 2 (1991), p. 213.

¹¹ Gillian Rose, "Place and Identity: A Sense of Place," in Doreen Massey and Pat Jess (eds.) *A Place in the World? Place, Cultures and Globalization* (Oxford: Open University/Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹² For example, Peter Bishop, *An Archetypal Constable: National Identity and the Geography of Nostalgia* (Cranbury NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1995).

¹³ Although England was certainly a "prototype" for nationalist movements elsewhere.

¹⁴ In general, see Stephen Daniels, *Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); on the depredations of agribusiness see Andrew O'Hagan, "The End of British Farming," *London Review of Books*, 22 March 2001, pp. 3-16.

¹⁵ See, for example, Martin Thom, "City, Region and Nation: Carlo Cattaneo and the Making of Italy." *Citizenship Studies*, 3 (1999), pp. 187-201.

¹⁶ Ian Baucom, *Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

¹⁷ John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: the History of a Relationship," in John R. Gillis (ed.) *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 7.

¹⁸ Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

¹⁹ John Agnew, "Liminal Travellers: Hebrideans at Home and Away." *Scotlands*, 3 (1996), pp. 31-42.

²⁰ See, for example, Stephen Daniels, *Fields of Vision*; and David Lowenthal, "British National Identity and the English Landscape."

²¹ Giorgio Chittolini, "Cities, 'City-States,' and Regional States in North-Central Italy," in Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (eds.) *Cities and the Rise of New States in Europe, A.D. 1000-1800* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 28. Also see Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy, 1700-1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London: Routledge, 1979).

²² Giorgio Chittolini, "Cities, 'City-States,' and Regional States in North-Central Italy," p. 40.

²³ See this book, Chapter 4.

²⁴ Kenneth Churchill, *Italy and English Literature, 1764-1930* (Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1980); W.M. Johnston, *In Search of Italy: Foreign Writers in Northern Italy Since 1800* (University Park PA: Penn State University Press, 1987).

²⁵ Albert Boime, "The Macchiaioli and the Risorgimento," in E. Tonelli and K. Hart (eds.) *The Macchiaioli: Painters of Italian Life, 1850-1900* (Los Angeles: Wight Art Gallery, UCLA, 1986), p. 38.

²⁶ Albert Boime, "The Macchiaioli and the Risorgimento," p. 36.

²⁷ Albert Boime, "The Macchiaioli and the Risorgimento," pp. 34-36.

²⁸ Telemaco Signorini, *Caricaturisti e caricaturati al Caffè Michelangiolo* (Florence: le Monnier, 1952).

²⁹ Alessandro Manzoni, *I promessi sposi/ The Betrothed*, trans. Bruce Penman (London: Penguin, 1972).

³⁰ Bruce Penman, "Introduction," in Alessandro Manzoni, *The Betrothed* (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 11.

³¹ Telemaco Signorini, *Caricaturisti e caricaturati al Caffè Michelangiolo* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1952), pp. 186-7.

³² Albert Boime, "The Macchiaioli and the Risorgimento," p. 70.

³³ Albert Boime, *The Art of the Macchia and the Risorgimento: Representing Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Italy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

³⁴ This was characteristic of the so-called *Strapaese* or ultra-countryside Fascists who were particularly well-established in Florence in the 1920s and 1930s. The polemical quality of Signorini's writing and the emphasis on making a complete break with the past to establish a truly Italian art can be seen, however, as a forerunner of Futurism and the modernist strand in Fascism, even though Futurism's enthusiasm for technology and speed contrasts markedly with the pastoral and everyday focus of the Macchiaioli painters. Turn-of-the-century Futurism was also a product of the industrialized urban north with powerful international connections that created a greater sense of the need to establish an Italian national art. See Caroline Tisdall and Angelo Bozzolla, *Futurism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), pp. 22-23.

³⁵ Cited in P. Treves, *L'idea di Roma e la cultura italiana del secolo XIX* (Milan-Naples: Ricciardi, 1962), p. 78.

³⁶ Alberto Caraccioli, *Roma capitale: dal Risorgimento alla crisi dello stato liberale* (Rome: Rinascita, 1956), p. 16.

³⁷ M. Birindelli, *Roma italiana, come fare una capitale e disfare una città* (Rome: Savelli, 1978), p. 23.

³⁸ M. Scattareggia, "Roma capitale: arretratezza e modernizzazione (1870-1914). *Storia Urbana*, 42 (1988), p.43.

³⁹ Giovanni Belardelli, "La terza Roma," in Giovanni Belardelli et al. *Miti e storia dell'Italia unita* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999).

⁴⁰ Bruno Tobia, "Urban Space and Monuments in the 'Nationalization of the Masses': the Italian case," in Stuart J. Woolf (ed.) *Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 180.

⁴¹ John Agnew, *Rome* (New York: Wiley, 1995), Chapter 3.

⁴² Bruno Tobia, *Una patria per gli italiani: spazi, itinerari, monumenti nell'Italia unita (1870-1900)*. (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 1991).

- ⁴³ Bruno Tobia, "Urban Space and Monuments in the 'Nationalization of the Masses,'" p. 182.
- ⁴⁴ David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove, "Embodied Identities: City, Nation and Empire at the Vittorio-Emmanuele II Monument in Rome." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 88 (1998), pp. 28-49.
- ⁴⁵ David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove, "Embodied Identities." More generally, for a range of interpretations of Fascism's aesthetic manipulations, see Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Simonetta Falasca Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); and Mabel Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). For an incisive critique of this literature for taking the claims of the Fascist regime too much at face value see R. J. B. Bosworth, "Per necessità familiare: Hypocrisy and Corruption in Fascist Italy." *European History Quarterly*, 30 (2000), pp. 357-87.
- ⁴⁶ John Agnew, "The Impossible Capital: Monumental Rome Under Liberal and Fascist Regimes, 1870-1943." *Geografiska Annaler B*, 80 (1998), pp. 229-40.
- ⁴⁷ John Agnew, *Rome*, Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
- ⁴⁸ As against, perhaps, the France described in Fernand Braudel, *The Identity of France. Volume I: History and Environment* (London: Collins, 1988).
- ⁴⁹ Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p.263.
- ⁵⁰ Enrico Castelnuovo and Carlo Ginzburg, "Centre and Periphery," in *History of Italian Art. Volume 1*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 101. Parenthetically, these authors also note, on p. 30, that "Even today, it is easier to go by train from Turin to Dijon than from Grosseto to Urbino."
- ⁵¹ See, for example, Paola Filipucci, "Anthropological Perspectives on Culture in Italy," in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds.) *Italian Cultural Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jeff Pratt, "Catholic Culture," in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds.) *Italian Cultural Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Roberto Cartocci, *Fra Lega e Chiesa. L'Italia in cerca di integrazione* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994).
- ⁵² See, e.g., Carl Levi (ed.) *Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics* (Oxford: Berg, 1996).
- ⁵³ John Agnew, "The Rhetoric of Regionalism: the Northern League in Italian Politics, 1983-1994." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 20 (1995), pp. 156-72. See Chapter 9.
- ⁵⁴ Stefano Guzzini, "The 'Long Night of the First Republic': Years of Clientelistic Implosion in Italy." *Review of International Political Economy*, 2 (1995), pp. 27-61. Many of the practices of *partitocrazia*, such as government contracts awarded on the basis of patronage rather than free bidding, persisted even as the parties that were its main anchors, DC and the PSI, disappeared.
- ⁵⁵ See, for example, Adrian Lyttelton, "Italy - The Triumph of TV." *New York Review of Books*, 41 (1994), pp. 25-9; Silvio Lanaro, *L'Italia Nuova: Identità e Sviluppo, 1861-1988* (Turin: Einaudi, 1989); Stefano Pivato, "Sport," in Patrick McCarthy (ed.) *Italy Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Stephen Gundle, "Feminine Beauty, National Identity and Political Conflict in Postwar Italy, 1945-1954." *Contemporary European History*, 8 (1999), pp. 359-78.
- ⁵⁶ Emilio Gentile, *La grande Italia. Ascesa e declino del mito della nazione nel ventesimo secolo* (Milan: Mondadori, 1997).
- ⁵⁷ John Agnew, "La città nel contesto culturale e i valori ambientale," in Calogero Muscarà and Lelio Paganì (eds.) *Natura e cultura nella città del futuro* (Bergamo: Consorzio del Parco dei Colli di Bergamo, 1988).
- ⁵⁸ Angela Dalle Vacche, *The Body in the Mirror: Shapes of History in Italian Cinema* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). By way of example, the uncertain symbolism of the Italian national flag is emphasized in Fiorenza Tarozzi and Giorgio Vecchio (eds.) *Gli italiani e il Tricolore. Patriottismo, identità nazionale e fratture sociali lungo due secoli di storia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999).
- ⁵⁹ Gregorio Penco, *Storia della Chiesa in Italia* (Milan: Jaca, 1977); David I. Kertzer, "Religion and Society, 1789-1892," in John A. Davis (ed.) *Italy in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Patrick McCarthy, "The Church in Post-war Italy," in Patrick McCarthy (ed.) *Italy Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). A powerful argument for the pivotal role of religion in often encouraging but sometimes discouraging nationalism and national identities is made by Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*.